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that implicit memory can drive behavioral 
responses on explicit memory tests aim-
ing to measure recollection and familiarity, 
which may cause distorted results. More 
specifically, apparent familiarity signals 
may in many cases be actually due to con-
ceptual priming. This corrupts the inter-
pretation of activation patterns during 
familiarity judgments and renders reverse 
inference problematic (Poldrack, 2006). 
Other researchers have pointed to the fact 
that a separation between brain  structures 
supporting recollection and familiarity is 
often confounded by memory strength 
(e.g., Wixted and Squire, 2010). It may be 
argued that, for instance, the categories 
of item vs. source memory can be more 
clearly operationalized and may better dis-
tinguish between involved brain structures 
and neural processes (e.g., Staresina and 
Davachi, 2008). While the assessment of 
recollection and familiarity typically relies 
on introspective reports that are inherently 
subjective, source memory can be objec-
tively assessed.
Recently, Henke (2010) moved beyond 
this methodological point and argued that 
in principle, memory operations should 
be characterized by different processing 
modes, and not by the involvement of con-
sciousness (explicit vs. implicit) or other 
phenomenal criteria. This line of reason-
ing was strongly motivated by neuroimag-
ing studies suggesting that the criterion for 
the recruitment of a specific brain structure 
is related to its computational role rather 
than to the phenomenal experiences dur-
ing the memory task. According to her new 
taxonomy, the hippocampus, for instance, 
accomplishes rapid encoding of flexible 
associations, while the parahippocampal 
gyrus supports rapid encoding of single 
items. Compared to the explicit vs. implicit 
dichotomy, the advantage of this classifica-
tion is that its relation to different brain 
structures is less ambiguous.
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Commonly used categories or axes to char-
acterize retrieval processes like explicit 
(declarative) vs. implicit (non-declarative) 
memory or recollection vs. familiarity 
are intuitively plausible (Tulving, 1985). 
Everyone can distinguish between the phe-
nomenal experience of “knowing” a per-
son and of “remembering” a more detailed 
context of previous encounters with this 
person. Thus, these categories are with-
out doubt relevant for an understanding 
of memory processes from a psychologi-
cal perspective. However, it is still an open 
question whether they are actually optimal 
in a cognitive neuroscience framework – 
in other words, whether these categories 
reflect distinct operations within the brain, 
or whether they are rather epiphenomenal. 
Which criteria should neurocognitive cat-
egories characterizing memory retrieval 
(and encoding) fulfill? First, it should be 
possible to unequivocally operationalize 
these categories in experimental paradigms. 
Second, such categories should allow one 
to classify memory operations accord-
ing to the involved brain structures and 
neural processes.
The explanatory value of the recollec-
tion vs. familiarity dichotomy is hampered 
by the difficulty to operationalize it appro-
priately. This issue has been highlighted by 
a recent review article (Voss et al., 2012) and 
a spotlight article (Paller et al., 2012). In 
these two papers, the authors have argued 
In a similar vein, Ranganath (2010) 
recently concluded in a review article that 
the functional differences between medial 
temporal subregions do not precisely cor-
respond to different types of memory tasks, 
cognitive processes, or states of awareness. 
In his opinion, present evidence indicates 
that medial temporal subregions mainly 
differ in terms of the kind of information 
they process and represent.
How could retrieval be investigated in 
a more mechanistic neuroscientific frame-
work which is closely related to the putative 
operational characteristics of specific brain 
regions? One attempt to study retrieval pro-
cesses using neurocomputational categories 
was based on the idea that source memory 
should be related to pattern completion, 
which might be implemented in specific 
hippocampal subregions (e.g., Norman and 
O’Reilly, 2003). More recently, the increas-
ing application of multivariate pattern 
classification analyses (MVPA) to memory 
research enabled a detection of distributed 
patterns of category- or even stimulus-spe-
cific activity (Rissman and Wagner, 2012). 
This method thus allowed one to test the 
long-standing hypothesis that retrieval 
consists in a re-instantiation of stimulus 
representations (Tulving and Thompson, 
1973). For example, MVPA of fMRI data 
revealed reoccurrence of category-specific 
activations initiated by retrieval, immedi-
ately before an item of this category was 
recalled (Polyn et al., 2005), and single-unit 
recordings in epilepsy patients even dem-
onstrated reactivation of stimulus-specific 
cellular activity preceding memory retrieval 
(Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008). Similarly, a 
replay of spatially selective sequences of 
hippocampal place cells has been observed 
during memory retrieval in rats (Pastalkova 
et al., 2008). Importantly, reinstatement of 
BOLD activity patterns was also found 
during recognition memory, regardless of 
whether it was associated with familiarity 
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or recollection judgments, although with 
a larger magnitude for recollection than 
familiarity responses (Johnson et al., 2009). 
Further studies are necessary to corroborate 
these findings. For the present, these results 
suggest that the investigation of retrieval 
processes by a mechanistic neurocognitive 
approach may result in different classifica-
tions of retrieval processes – with possibly 
fewer and better defined distinctions – than 
classifications based on phenomenally 
motivated categories.
To summarize, although there is a long 
tradition to use categories like explicit vs. 
implicit or recollection vs. familiarity in 
memory research, it is still an open ques-
tion whether the brain actually operates 
with these categories. In our opinion it is 
an important challenge to explore whether 
there are other memory categories, like 
processing modes (Henke, 2010), item vs. 
source memory (Staresina and Davachi, 
2008), or the degree of pattern instantia-
tion (Johnson et al., 2009), which are more 
closely related to brain structures and neu-
ral processes, and to clarify how these cat-
egories relate to those commonly used.
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